Introduction
We are calling on the Government to put together a task force, in the same way it has done for other parts of the country, to minimise the effect this will have on workers and their families (North East Chamber of Commerce Spokesman, quoted in The Journal 15 July 2000).
And so another Task Force was born. This time to address the job losses from the Corus steel-making operations in Teesside. The Task Force 'phenomenon' (Barker et al., 1999) or 'revolution' (MacLeod, 1998) has seen this form of organisation multiply rapidly across government. At the national level, 295 Task Forces had been established between 1997 and 1999 to address a multitude of policy design and implementation questions (Barker et al., 1999) . The Task Force has been especially prevalent in addressing economic development concerns. The former DETR established 39 Task Forces (13% of the total), including the high profile Coalfields and Urban Task Forces (1998) , and the model has been utilised by the devolved administrations (House of Commons, 2001) . Task Forces have also been sprouting at the local and regional levels throughout the UK. What Bennett et al. (2000: 6) describes, referring to the Coalfields Task Force, as a "unique intervention in the politics of regeneration". The North East region of England in particular has seen a dramatic flowering of Task Forces in economic development activity, where 28 have been established (all but one since 1997), focused upon employers, sectors and/or territories.
Despite their 'bacterial growth' (Barker et al., 1999) , little is known about the establishment, operation, organisation, funding, membership or effectiveness of such Task Forces. This paper examines these issues by analysing the experience of the North East region of England in using Task Forces to organise economic development. First, these developments are situated in the context of the historical evolution of state modernisation and New Labour's role in unleashing the Task Force 'revolution' since 1997. Second, recent commentary on the Task Force phenomenon is reviewed. Third, questions of definition, origin and analysis are tackled. Fourth, the empirical case is examined and critical issues for Task Forces in organising economic development activity are raised. The study argues that New Labour's experimental use of Task Forces reflects a particular mediation of more general tendencies in the historical evolution of state modernisation that varies in particular and contingent ways at the local and regional level. The research reveals the continued importance of the existing public and public/private sector institutions, the less significant and contingent role of the private sector and the Task Force's contribution to the UK's 'quasi-governance' with its problems of co-ordination, transparency and accountability. In the face of growing criticism and adverse reaction to the 'governance by expertise' embodied in Task Forces, a renewed and democratised politics of economic development governance is required to establish the accountability and legitimacy of such bodies in the context of the UK political economy's emergent multi-layered governance system.
Issues in the current era of the historical evolution of state modernisation
The historical evolution of 'modern' nation states has undergone an intensified and profound period of change since the emergent crisis of the post-war growth settlement and (neo-)Keynesian welfarist state forms in the early 1970s (Anderson, 1995; Block, 1994; Habermas, 1999) . The ensuing three decades have witnessed protracted debate concerning the changing nature of the state, concerning several general tendencies.
First, the deepened internationalisation -or even 'globalisation' (Held et al., 1999) of the world economy has led to the apparent 'hollowing out' of nation states as powers and responsibilities have been lost to supranational, sub-national, regional and local institutions (Jessop, 1997) . This 'hollowing out' thesis argues that a more complex -multi-layered -governance system has emerged with heightened interpenetration between formerly discrete policy domains and institutions operating at different scales (Held et al., 1999) within which (for some) the nation state retains a pivotal role (Boyer and Drache, 1996; Habermas, 1999; Hirst and Thompson, 1999) .
Second, political economic ideology and state strategy has been dominated by the 'global neo-classicism' of neo-liberalism from the late 1970s (Michie and Grieve Smith, 1995) . While containing an array of national variants, a common political economic project and policy programme of deregulation/liberalisation, fiscal austerity and monetary control have underpinned the reshaping of state forms and strategies (Berger and Dore, 1996; Rogers Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997) . The mid-1990s witnessed reflection upon the performance of the twin poles of 1980s-style market liberalism and pre-1980s state interventionism in the context of the post-1989 transition in the centrally planned economies of the former Eastern bloc (Hodgson, 1999) . Debate has ensued concerning a putative 'Third Way' political economic project between market and state to provide a guiding theoretical shell for state modernisation (Giddens, 1998; Habermas, 1999) . Commentators claim that in the current era of 'globalisation' rapid and closely inter-related changes are creating unprecedented levels of uncertainty and complexity such that neither traditional statecentred Left nor market-oriented Right approaches are solely viable for state policy.
Third, there is an apparent crisis of faith in the institutions of government and traditional forms of representative democracy (Block, 1994; Leadbetter and Mulgan, 1997) . Public distrust in politicians and the political process is rife and manifest in falling electoral turnouts, public cynicism and the rise of non-traditional bases of collective action (Held et al., 1999) . Echoing the classical liberal view of the state (Block, 1994) , this tendency has emphasised the failure in the capacities of public institutions to deliver sustained prosperity and has beset especially the advanced industrial economies (Gray, 1997; Habermas, 1999) .
These generalised tendencies have punctuated the current period of state modernisation and created a context of uncertainty and complexity. This situation is marked by perhaps several emergent issues. First, a post-ideological pragmatism appears to be shaping the political economic projects of nation states. Some claim state strategy and action is no longer easily ascribed a 'Left' or 'Right' label as innovative combinations of market and/or state solutions are brought together to address intractable problems (e.g. Giddens, 1995; Turner, 2001) . In this pragmatic climate the simplistic 'quantitative' understanding of the deepening or withdrawal of state intervention appears to have been exhausted (Block, 1994) . In its place, more nuanced conceptions of 'qualitative' changes in the mode and nature of state forms have been suggested (O'Neill, 1997) -as states simultaneously both cede (e.g. monetary, fiscal policy) and extend (e.g. welfare state, institutional forms of government) powers in different areas (Martin and Sunley, 1997) .
Second, a sense of failure and uncertainty has triggered a wave of profound reorganisation and 'institutional searching' (Peck and Tickell, 1994) . While changes in the state's internal mode of operation is response to external crises is not in itself new (see Offe, 1975) , experimentation with new forms of governing and policy development and delivery has expanded dramatically in the current era:
In every capitalist nation, the old institutional frameworks are being abandoned as economic organisations, social groups and states themselves search for new institutional configurations more congruent with the markedly different, and still rapidly changing, economic conditions of 'post-Fordism' (Martin, 1999: 4) .
Such changes have comprised far reaching constitutional reforms and devolutionary projects aimed at reorganising the structures of central, regional and local government (Tomaney, 2000) . The 'de-statization' of the political system is evident (Jessop 1997: 574) . This process is reflected in the shift from government to governance across territorial scales and functions and in the: movement from the central role of official state apparatus in securing state-sponsored economic and social projects and political hegemony towards an emphasis on partnerships between governmental, paragovernmental and non-governmental organizations in which the state apparatus is often only first among equals (Jessop 1997: 574-575 ).
For Jessop (1997: 575) this involves governance -that is, "the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence". Such 'quasi-government' has been functional to states to incorporate independent specialised expertise and to devolve responsibility but has raised concerns about co-ordination, transparency and accountability (Morgan and Roberts, 1993; Skelcher et al., 2000) . However, Jessop (1997) also recognises that government still has a key role to play in the counter tendency of 'meta-governance' through, for example, setting the ground rules for governance and ensuring the compatibility of different governance mechanisms and regimes.
The generalised tendencies and emerging issues evident in the current era in the historical evolution of state modernisation carry with them no necessary nor deterministic changes. While common elements clearly exist and inter-state learning is evident (Jessop, 1997) , the extent to which 'hollowing out', 'Third Way' strategy and the crisis of faith and experimentation with government institutions have proceeded differs significantly between and within nation states. Pressures for reorganisation are mediated by particular nation states and their concrete manifestations are contingent and remain empirical questions. The specific ways in which such forces are reflected in the mode and nature of state forms and strategies are unavoidably refracted by the particular historical evolution of the nation state (Hodgson, 1999) , and its position within both the international division of labour and the multi-level governance system operating across and between supranational, national, sub-national, regional and local scales. The reality for the changing mode and nature of state action in different national contexts is graduated and complex and combines evidence of radical transitions and resistance with a mix of old and new pressures and experiments (Martin and Sunley, 1997) . This era in the evolution of state modernisation is the context within which New Labour's experiments with Task Forces may be understood.
Interpreting New Labour's Task Force 'revolution'
Labourites had to offset their mummified economies with an ostentatious display of verbosely political radicalism -'youthism', 'high-technicism', millennial and style-mania, and the accumulation of think-tanks and divining rods in appropriate official, quasi-official and entirely spontaneous polyhedrons (Nairn, 2000: 50) .
The particular pattern of recent development in the UK state reflects its specific mediation of the general tendencies and emerging issues in the historical evolution of state modernisation. The current era of New Labour in government has presaged a series of significant changes in the UK political economy, including nods in the direction of 'Third Way' and 'Stakeholder Capitalism' ideas (Hutton, 1999) ; constitutional reforms and devolution (Tomaney, 2000) ; post-ideological pragmatism based upon evidence-based public policy making (Stewart, 1999) ; new combinations of market discipline and state facilitation (Peck, 1999) ; experimentation with new organisational/territorial modes of co-ordination (Bennett and Payne, 2001) ; and the involvement of external expertise in the body politic (Barker et al., 1999) . Views differ regarding the coherence and significance of such changes. For some, New Labour's political project fits within a centrist renewal of social democracy through its experimentation with the 'Third Way' (Giddens, 1998) . Critical accounts question the ideologically rootless and opportunistic nature of New Labour (Hutton, 1999) .
Some claim New Labour has been actively 'hollowing out' the UK state through, amongst other forces: "a näive faith in the capacity of innumerable local partnerships, specialist agencies and 'little platoons' to deliver the goods locally (in an innovative as well as cheap fashion)" (Peck, 1999: 133) .
While their significance remains in question, the current growth of Task Forces across government appears to occupy a key role in New Labour's state modernisation project. An integral part of its vision of 'holistic government' and revitalising territorial governance has been the emphasis upon including interest groups ('stakeholders') in far reaching and inter-connected ('joined-up') approaches to intractable ('wicked' or 'cross-cutting') issues (Mawson, 1999) . This approach has sought to reduce 'departmentalism', decentralise decision-making and encourage innovation in a bid to combat the forces of fragmentation and disintegration that have hampered Government institutions and policy in recent decades. This vision has resulted in a rash of experimentation with new organisational/territorial modes of coordination -Task Forces, Zones, Priority Action Teams, Horizontal Working Groups, Inter-Agency Projects and Neighbourhoods. Echoing a 'new centrism' in economic development (Geddes and Newman, 1999) such institutional experiments have become widespread (Stewart, 1999) . Force implies the search for consensus and demonstrates the Government's commitment to partnership working and transparency. Macleod concluded that it is unclear and perhaps too early to say, first, whether the Task Force revolution is either a "one-off political fad with a limited shelf life" (p. viii) or an evolving phenomenon, and second, whether Task Forces will have a significant or lasting impact on policy outcomes. Barker et al. (1999) provided a thorough audit of the Task Force phenomenon in the body politic within the UK. They argued that there is nothing new in state attempts to co-opt the expertise of external interests into state activity (e.g. the Webb's 'industrial and social chamber') but the scale and character of the current Task Force phenomenon suggests it is more pervasive and influential. In contrast to Macleod's more positive claims, they are concerned about Task Forces' lack of accountability and haphazard management by government. Lord Smith of Clifton (Barker et al., 1999: 7) makes the point that the Task Forces: "…must not be allowed to coagulate into an hermetically sealed policy universe that effectively undermines due process and inhibits widespread open discussion". Barker et al. (1999) conclude that Task Forces are a 'new governing species' that has avoided the public gaze and has the potential to neglect the public that they are designed to serve. Skelcher et al.'s (2000: 12) analysis of the advance of the 'Quango State' under New Labour highlighted the "unforeseen and unsupervised" rush of Task Forces created after 1997. For them, this ad hoc flourish of executive power has added to the 'quasi-governance' of the UK as their members remain outside the Nolan public appointment rules (justified on the basis of their temporary lifespan). Since such bodies were co-opted into Government at an influential time for policy making and some had lasted long enough to become permanent Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) and hence be 'Nolanised', Skelcher et al. (2000) argue that they should be included in reforms to increase transparency and accountability of the 'Quango State'.
Platt's (1998) 'Government by Task Force' argued that the 'mushrooming' of Task Forces raises serious questions about New Labour's style of government. The allegedly inclusive and pluralist nature of Task Forces is questioned since the voices of women, ethnic minorities, youth and organised labour are inadequately represented relative to business and the private sector. Further, Platt (1998: 4) argues that:
the Task Forces and review bodies have been designed to foster support for its [government] policies, rather than debate about them. Their main objective is to neutralise political opposition and to create a new national consensus around the central tenets of Blairism.
Platt concluded that 'New Labour' is using Task Forces to concentrate power in the centre and to govern through a wider range of elites, bypassing both public and parliament. A neo-Marxist reading of the Task Force phenomenon might go further in its criticism. Such institutional experiments might be interpreted as an attempt by the state to internalise and contain territorialised accumulation crises arising from the necessary contradictions of capitalism that, in due course, ultimately emerge to undermine the state's mode of crisis management (Habermas, 1975) . A Task Force could be seen as a compensatory institutional intervention by the state that seeks to defend the existing socio-economic order by mopping up the consequences of localised capital devalorisation and exempting capital from significant reparations.
While focusing upon more formalised NDPBs (e.g. Commissions, boards and regulatory authorities), Centre-Right commentators too are critical of New Labour's voluntary transfer of decision-making power from the executive to new independent bodies staffed by technocratic elites (Mather, 2000) . Such bodies -which go "beyond the odd business leader brought in, singly or in a task force to help a government department" (p. 8-9) -'de-politicise' decisions, remove responsibility from ministers and raise constitutional questions concerning their accountability. McElwee (2000) argued that New Labour is 'surreptitiously' creating a 'New Class' by rewarding supporters with patronage and positions of power at the heart of government. This 'cronyism', disputed by Barker et al. (1999) for incorporating a plural array of (potentially elite) interests (especially from the producer/private sectors but less from women, youth, ethnic minorities and trade unions) to provide independent and specialised guidance for policy development across government. Third, the new institutional forms may work to concentrate power centrally by providing a means through which responsibility (rather than power) can be devolved, debate stifled and decisions 'de-politicised'. Last, the co-ordination, transparency and accountability of these new forms of organisation, particularly within a multi-layered governance structure, are haphazard and often unclear as they appear to operate outside of the conventional structures of public scrutiny. However, in focusing upon Task Forces in particular, little is still known about why they have been used in specific policy areas, how they get established, what they actually do, how they are organised and funded, and whether or not they are effective. Such questions provide the research agenda for examining Task Forces in economic development at the local and regional level in the case of the North East region of England.
Definition, origin and analysis
The word 'Task Force' has become a buzzword… …in the absence of any definition… …wide statistical differences [in their estimated numbers] demonstrate the absence of any common starting point. One person's 'Task Force' is clearly another person's 'review' (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2000: 124).
In definitional terms, Task Forces remain slippery creatures. National studies identify functionally diverse bodies that serve a variety of purposes and cover a multiplicity of issues. The new bodies even go by different names: Task Forces, advisory groups, action groups, sounding boards. Their classification is neither a simple or neat exercise. Most Task Forces were established by Ministers early in New Labour's tenure: "to investigate and recommend new policies and practices or… …practical means of implementing policies" (Barker et al., 1999: 11) . They were different from established government practice in the scale of their inclusion of 'external' interests (particularly business), independence and operation within a given and limited time frame. A distinction was also drawn between these new bodies and the reviews and consultation exercises that were routine Civil Service work as well as Royal Commissions, Departmental Committees of Inquiry, Standing Expert Advisory Committees and Standing Statutory Advisory Boards. The explosive growth of Task Forces after 1997 may be traced to reflection within the Civil Service, including ideas about the creation of government (rather than external) 'task forces' for issues where:
"if it will take two to six months hard work, it should go to a task force -but if, and only if, it requires substantial inter-departmental co-ordination. Anything requiring much longer preparation should go to a Royal Commission" (cited in Daniel 1997) and the need for "radically re-engineered forms of government, perhaps around project teams staffed by skilled specialists and supported by a central core" (Wintour, 2000) .
During the early days of New Labour, Ministers, Whitehall press officers and the media were often happy to call almost any new inquiry a 'new government Task Force'. Parts of government even felt they were missing out: "We haven't set up any task forces yet, but it is under review" (Welsh Office spokersperson cited in Daniel, 1997: 27) . The name assumed an urgent, pseudo-military connotation that the Government was doing something positive and timely about an issue, contrasting with the softer language of partnership, community development and neighbourhood renewal. Military metaphors such as Task Forces lend purpose and apparent determination to political gestures (Mullan, 2001) . (Keating and Boyle, 1987) . However, the current crop even lack a distinct linkage to the 1981 'Merseyside Task Force' that represented "a hitherto untried mode of regional based combined inter-departmental and public/private sector collaboration" (Lindley, 1985: 70) reporting directly to a senior member of the Cabinet Office and were utilised in urban policy circles during the 1980s (Greenhalgh, 1999) .
Given the uncertainty surrounding the late 1990s emergence of the Task Force (with various individuals and interests claiming they have invented it anew), some common identifying characteristics are required if the concept is to be used for meaningful analysis. Such elements might include: multi-agency; selected and invited membership; ultimately temporary but initially indeterminate period of operation (unlike national Task Forces); non-statutory (i.e. non-Quangos); established for specific purposes; flexible and 'rapid response' operation often via working subgroups; and working across a range of inter-related levels (employer, sector and/or territory). These dimensions differ in their extent in particular Task Forces (not least in their names) but at least some of these general features are evident. Task Forces share many characteristics with the more commonly recognised partnerships prevalent in the 1990s. Indeed, some writers use the terms interchangeably (e.g. . The main differences are, first, Task 
Task Forces for economic development in the North East region of England 2
The North East region of England continues to suffer from the economic, social and political malaise associated with structural change generated by the restructuring of its traditional economic base and its relatively marginal position within the national political economy (Pike, 1999a) . The chronic nature of these problems has long meant the North East has been a 'state-managed' region (Hudson, 1998) , susceptible to 2 This empirical research is drawn from a study that sought to investigate the local and regional economic development Task Forces in the North East region of England in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In-depth interviews were conducted with over 20 key informants from within the local and regional economic development community, including Task Force members and national civil servants. An audit of documentary evidence was also undertaken concerning the extent and character of economic development Task Force organisation and structure ( Table 1 ). The broadly constituted national Task Forces linked to government departments that indirectly impinged upon economic development issues, for example the DTI Competitiveness Task Force, were excluded from this study. (Table 1) 3 . Their rapid growth has been accompanied by a vision of their effectiveness amongst the 'regional partnership':
The Government Office has a long history of association with Task 
Who gets a Task Force and who doesn't?
There is no single way in which the Task Forces have been established and each is often contingent upon the evolution of particular circumstances. Some are the result of central government initiative and Ministerial decision-making (sometimes) in close consultation with regional local authorities, the RDA and GO-NE (Table 1) . Others tend to be more locally grown and local authority-led. Establishing a Task Force has become highly politicised within the region. Objective criteria for Task Force establishment are noticeably lacking. Some interest groups have had to lobby in order to get their situation recognised as warranting a Task Force (e.g. GMB trade union/Textiles Task Force) (Pike et al., 1998 In other cases, interest groups were adamant that they did not want the assignation of a Task Force to deal with their situation (e.g. firms undergoing redundancy programmes). They feared that it may have drawn unwanted attention, undermined confidence and perhaps even hastened their decline. Some interests failed in their attempts to get a Task Force established -or at least one with sufficient scope and clout to command new resources -and fell back on more locally-grown solutions.
What do Task Forces do?
The strategic aims of the Task Forces were typically moulded by their particular circumstances and shaped by their membership. The first job was for the leading players to decide upon the membership and to draw up their terms of reference. Those addressing closures tended to keep their objectives flexible in order to respond rapidly to unfolding situations whereas the explicitly sectoral and territorial Task Forces often worked with more formalised and longer-term objectives. Each mixed advisory and implementation roles ( Table 2 ). The area-based Task Forces had the most comprehensive brief to address deeper questions of structural adjustment. A transition was evident in the move away from an initial focus on 'hard', 'bricks and mortar' infrastructure issues to 'softer', people and social issues. The ways in which the Task Forces were established were often influenced by what they were set up to do. Where an area had been subject to concentrated economic decline, rather than establish separate Task Forces to respond to each situation, the opportunity was often taken to approach the structural problems of area regeneration in a more holistic and comprehensive manner. In Sunderland, for example, major employers Groves Cranes and the Vaux brewery closed with the loss of over 1,500 jobs in less than two years. While it is early days for many Task Forces, preliminary soundings reveal a mixture of prospects and problems (Pike, 2001) . Task 
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Issues for Task Forces in organising economic development:
The high level of involvement of the public sector and Local Authorities
The economic development Task Forces in the North East contain high levels of public sector and local authority involvement. Measured in terms of individuals from organisations that are Task Force members, the public sector is dominant followed by public-private sector organisations (including RDAs and TECs due to their 'business- hand, the Task Forces were established to bring together a plural array of interests to address a particular concern and could perhaps be less effective if dominated by a particular interest group, albeit a democratically legitimate one. Compounding this issue, private sector involvement has been less significant and contingent upon particular circumstances, ranging from constructive and supportive to obstructive and damaging.
Time-limited or standing bodies?
Given the ingrained structural problems and recurrent need for regeneration in regions like the North East, the question arises whether a proliferation of time-limited, ad hoc and piecemeal responses to economic development is sufficient. Task Forces may be rather limited organisations addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of economic decline. In addition, the RDA and some local authorities were beginning to feel the strain of heavy involvement in a range of Task Forces (Table 3 ). Members
were adamant that Task Forces should be time-limited and task-focused. However, a grey area emerged in relation to the broader context of the duration of Task Force operation. Given their initially indeterminate life-span, their duration of operation varied significantly -from under 12 months to currently ongoing after 2 yearsdepending upon the contingent nature of their specific circumstances.
The question is whether a more strategic, integrated and co-ordinated approach could be taken to structural economic development concerns rather than simply expanding the flotilla of Task Forces to address the symptoms. Such an approach may need to be provided by a standing body -a single organisation, infrastructure or network of individuals and organisations -that might be better placed to deal with situations before or as they emerge. Such a regionally rooted body could perhaps 'get a feel' -not in the sense of a prediction or forecast -for situations before they develop into
crises. An example is the 'South Tyneside Redundancies -Rapid Response Group' that meets regularly to chase progress on previous activities, reviews current work, tries to pick up the 'weak signals' of impending problems and is accountable to its local authority (Pike, 1999b) . This may prove workable and manageable only at the local rather than the regional level. While acknowledged by the RDA, it was somewhat reticent about taking sole responsibility for such an ongoing strategic overview. In particular, it was also unclear how the regional overview could take account of and link meaningfully into local situations, perhaps requiring a stronger role for the newly established Sub-Regional Partnerships (Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Durham, Tees Valley).
Co-ordination
The recent proliferation of Task short-term issues and meet the demand for involvement in Task Forces (Table 3 ).
There are signs that this problem is being recognised but not remedied since the Task Force model is considered a valid response to particular problem situations rather than something that the 'regional partnership' would like to see manifest and ongoing. A newly beefed-up GO-NE? (see Performance and Innovation Unit, 2000) .
Transparency and accountability
The transparency and accountability of Task Forces is a concern. Task Forces appear to be contributing to the 'democratic deficit' caused by the growth of 'quasigovernance' spending public money and being run by people who are unelected and unaccountable (House of Commons, 2001; Skelcher et al., 2000) . Indeed, the former Chair of the Public Administration Select Committee, Rhodri Morgan claimed that just as the Quangos were being brought under the control of the Nolan reforms of public appointments Task Forces emerged as a new 'second phalanx' of Quangos outside these rules (Barker et al., 1999) . Regionally too, concerns have been articulated, for instance, regarding the future of the Sunderland ARC Task Force:
The regeneration company is a good thing and I am happy to sign up to it. But the question is how it is set up and who it is accountable to. We don't want another development corporation-type body with the problem of accountability. The Sunderland partnership wants to be part of the operation (Leader of Sunderland City Council quoted in Heywood, 2000) . At the heart of this transparency and accountability problem for Task Forces is their membership. Patronage is a concern alongside the potential for a descent into a cosy 'court politics' of favourites and hangers-on that stifles debate and discussion of alternative economic development strategies in preference to the prevailing 'common sense'. Since membership is constructed through careful selection and private invite from the instigating organisation, often in relative haste, the Task Forces have tended to be exclusive rather than inclusive. The first signs of a new elite of the 'usual suspects' of appointed or nominated members -with no doubt valuable skills and experience to offer -has begun to emerge raising concerns over undue and sectional influence and the domination of regional governance by an emergent regional service class (Lovering, 1999) . While the vast majority (84%) of individuals involved held memberships in only one Task Force, nearly 12% were on two, 3% on three and just over 2% on four (Table 4 ). In addition, the gender of Task Force members is overwhelmingly dominated by men, only 48 of 326 (15%) were women (see Robinson and Shaw, 2000) .
How can Task Forces be made more transparent and accountable? How might their membership be monitored and regulated? Should they be made publicly to publish meeting minutes and final reports? Where should they sit in the emerging territorial governance structure for economic development in the UK? Given their proliferation these are thorny questions. Potentially, Task Forces could be made answerable and open to scrutiny by the relevant democratically legitimate bodies in the territories in which they operate. This might be more easily solved at the local and county levels through local authorities. At the regional level, this might happen via the scrutiny role of the Regional Chamber over the RDA in the absence of elected regional government.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to examine the utilisation of Task Forces as an institutional coordination mechanism through an empirical analysis of the experience of the North East region of England in using Task Forces to organise economic development activity. The study argues that New Labour's use of Task Forces reflects a particular mediation of more general tendencies and emerging issues in the historical evolution of state modernisation. Further particular and contingent variations on the national picture are evident at the local and regional level in the context of an uneven process of 'hollowing out' at the national level and an increasingly multi-layered governance system. The Task Force concept, while not unambiguous in some areas of usage, is revealed as having theoretical substance and analytical merit. Nationally, the proliferation of Task Forces is evidence of the 'de-statization' of the political system and the uneasy tension between governance and meta-governance wherein the 'shadow of hierarchy' (Jessop, 1997: 575) circumstances -that is constructed through the selective incorporation of shared interest groups, mainly from the public and public/private sectors. These Task Forces remain experimental and are largely unproven due to the absence of independent assessment, although they claim (with some voracity) varying degrees of success in achieving their objectives. The peculiarly UK twist to this narrative is that these Task Forces appear to be contributing to the growth of 'quasi-governance' (Skelcher et al., 2000) and its attendant problems of co-ordination, transparency and accountability.
The North East's economic development Task Forces confirm this national view as the evidence revealed issues of over-use and proliferation, lack of co-ordination and limited local and regional transparency and accountability.
A project which began with a slogan of 'de-quangofication'…[has] led to a circumstance in which quangos, task forces, commissions have multiplied and proliferated. And this is a deep paradox…unless we grapple with this irony in all of its depth…we'll be stuck with a situation in which we'll have countless ephemeral, unremembered and ineffective quangos proliferating against a background of weakened ineffective institutions or their shadows (John Gray, quoted in Walker, 2000) .
Task Forces may turn out to be rather more profound in their significance than initially thought. Two deeper currents are pertinent. First, the state's mode of crisis management appears under threat. As Gray suggests, there is mounting scrutiny and criticism of such 'quasi-governance' and growing demands that appropriate co- 
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